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The Federal Reserve Cartel: Part II: The Freemason BUS & The House of Rothschild

Fabulous "sea" horses and mermaids with baby mantatees.  Trang, Thailand.(Part two of a five-part series excerpted from Chapter 19: The Eight Families: Big Oil & Their Bankers…)

In 1789 Alexander Hamilton became the first Treasury Secretary of the United States.  Hamilton was one of many Founding Fathers who were Freemasons. He had close relations with the Rothschild family which owns the Bank of England and leads the European Freemason movement.  George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Ethan Allen, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, John Brown and Roger Sherman were all Masons.

Roger Livingston helped Sherman and Franklin write the Declaration of Independence. He gave George Washington his oaths of office while he was Grand Master of the New York Grand Lodge of Freemasons.  Washington himself was Grand Master of the Virginia Lodge.  Of the General Officers in the Revolutionary Army, thirty-three were Masons.  This was highly symbolic since 33rd Degree Masons become Illuminated. [1]

Populist founding fathers led by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Thomas Paine- none of whom were Masons- wanted to completely severe ties with the British Crown, but were overruled by the Masonic faction led by Washington, Hamilton and Grand Master of the St. Andrews Lodge in Boston General Joseph Warren, who wanted to “defy Parliament but remain loyal to the Crown”. St. Andrews Lodge was the hub of New World Masonry and began issuing Knights Templar Degrees in 1769. [2]

All US Masonic lodges are to this day warranted by the British Crown, whom they serve as a global intelligence and counterrevolutionary subversion network. Their most recent initiative is the Masonic Child Identification Program (CHIP). According to Wikipedia, the CHIP programs allow parents the opportunity to create a kit of identifying materials for their child, free of charge. The kit contains a fingerprint card, a physical description, a video, computer disk, or DVD of the child, a dental imprint, and a DNA sample.

The First Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in 1774 under the Presidency of Peyton Randolph, who succeeded Washington as Grand Master of the Virginia Lodge.  The Second Continental Congress convened in 1775 under the Presidency of Freemason John Hancock.  Peyton’s brother William succeeded him as Virginia Lodge Grand Master and became the leading proponent of centralization and federalism at the First Constitutional Convention in 1787.  The federalism at the heart of the US Constitution is identical to the federalism laid out in the Freemason’s Anderson’s Constitutions of 1723. William Randolph became the nation’s first Attorney General and Secretary of State under George Washington. His family returned to England loyal to the Crown.  John Marshall, the nation’s first Supreme Court Justice, was also a Mason. [3]

When Benjamin Franklin journeyed to France to seek financial help for American revolutionaries, his meetings took place at Rothschild banks.  He brokered arms sales via German Mason Baron von Steuben.  His Committees of Correspondence operated through Freemason channels and paralleled a British spy network.  In 1776 Franklin became de facto Ambassador to France.  In 1779 he became Grand Master of the French Neuf Soeurs (Nine Sisters) Lodge, to which John Paul Jones and Voltaire belonged.  Franklin was also a member of the more secretive Royal Lodge of Commanders of the Temple West of Carcasonne, whose members included Frederick Prince of Whales. While Franklin preached temperance in the US, he cavorted wildly with his Lodge brothers in Europe.  Franklin served as Postmaster General from the 1750’s to 1775 – a role traditionally relegated to British spies. [4]

With Rothschild financing Alexander Hamilton founded two New York banks, including Bank of New York. [5]  He died in a gun battle with Aaron Burr, who founded Bank of Manhattan with Kuhn Loeb financing.  Hamilton exemplified the contempt which the Eight Families hold towards common people, once stating, “All communities divide themselves into the few and the many.  The first are the rich and the well born, the others the mass of the people…The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge and determine right.  Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share of government.  They will check the unsteadiness of the second.”[6]

Hamilton was only the first in a series of Eight Families cronies to hold the key position of Treasury Secretary.  In recent times Kennedy Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon came from Dillon Read (now part of UBS Warburg). Nixon Treasury Secretaries David Kennedy and William Simon came from Continental Illinois Bank (now part of Bank of America) and Salomon Brothers (now part of Citigroup), respectively. Carter Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal came from Goldman Sachs, Reagan Treasury Secretary Donald Regan came from Merrill Lynch (now part of Bank of America), Bush Sr. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady came from Dillon Read (UBS Warburg) and both Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Bush Jr. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson came from Goldman Sachs. Obama Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner worked at Kissinger Associates and the New York Fed.

Thomas Jefferson argued that the United States needed a publicly-owned central bank so that European monarchs and aristocrats could not use the printing of money to control the affairs of the new nation.  Jefferson extolled, “A country which expects to remain ignorant and free…expects that which has never been and that which will never be.  There is scarcely a King in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh – get first all the people’s money, then all their lands and then make them and their children servants forever…banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies.  Already they have raised up a money aristocracy.” Jefferson watched as the Euro-banking conspiracy to control the United States unfolded, weighing in, “Single acts of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of the day, but a series of oppressions begun at a distinguished period, unalterable through every change of ministers, too plainly prove a deliberate, systematic plan of reducing us to slavery”. [7[

But the Rothschild-sponsored Hamilton’s arguments for a private US central bank carried the day.  In 1791 the Bank of the United States (BUS) was founded, with the Rothschilds as main owners.  The bank’s charter was to run out in 1811.  Public opinion ran in favor of revoking the charter and replacing it with a Jeffersonian public central bank.  The debate was postponed as the nation was plunged by the Euro-bankers into the War of 1812.  Amidst a climate of fear and economic hardship, Hamilton’s bank got its charter renewed in 1816.

Old Hickory, Honest Abe & Camelot

In 1828 Andrew Jackson took a run at the US Presidency.  Throughout his campaign he railed against the international bankers who controlled the BUS.  Jackson ranted, “You are a den of vipers.  I intend to expose you and by Eternal God I will rout you out.  If the people understood the rank injustices of our money and banking system there would be a revolution before morning.”

Jackson won the election and revoked the bank’s charter stating, “The Act seems to be predicated on an erroneous idea that the present shareholders have a prescriptive right to not only the favor, but the bounty of the government...for their benefit does this Act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly.  Present stockholders and those inheriting their rights as successors be established a privileged order, clothed both with great political power and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connection with government.  Should its influence be concentrated under the operation of such an Act as this, in the hands of a self-elected directory whose interests are identified with those of the foreign stockholders, will there not be cause to tremble for the independence of our country in war...controlling our currency, receiving our public monies and holding thousands of our citizens independence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military power of the enemy.  It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government for selfish make the rich richer and more powerful.  Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by acts of Congress.  I have done my duty to this country.”[8]

Populism prevailed and Jackson was re-elected. In 1835 he was the target of an assassination attempt.  The gunman was Richard Lawrence, who confessed that he was, “in touch with the powers in Europe”. [9]

Still, in 1836 Jackson refused to renew the BUS charter.  Under his watch the US national debt went to zero for the first and last time in our nation’s history.  This angered the international bankers, whose primary income is derived from interest payments on debt.  BUS President Nicholas Biddle cut off funding to the US government in 1842, plunging the US into a depression.  Biddle was an agent for the Paris-based Jacob Rothschild. [10]

The Mexican War was simultaneously sprung on Jackson. A few years later the Civil War was unleashed, with London bankers backing the Union and French bankers backing the South. The Lehman family made a fortune smuggling arms to the south and cotton to the north.  By 1861 the US was $100 million in debt.  New President Abraham Lincoln snubbed the Euro-bankers again, issuing Lincoln Greenbacks to pay Union Army bills.

The Rothschild-controlled Times of London wrote, “If that mischievous policy, which had its origins in the North American Republic, should become indurated down to a fixture, then that Government will furnish its own money without cost. It will pay off its debts and be without debt. It will have all the money necessary to carry on its commerce. It will become prosperous beyond precedent in the history of the civilized governments of the world. The brains and the wealth of all countries will go to North America. That government must be destroyed, or it will destroy every monarchy on the globe.” [11]

The Euro-banker-written Hazard Circular was exposed and circulated throughout the country by angry populists.  It stated, “The great debt that capitalists will see is made out of the war and must be used to control the valve of money.  To accomplish this government bonds must be used as a banking basis.  We are now awaiting Secretary of Treasury Salmon Chase to make that recommendation.  It will not allow Greenbacks to circulate as money as we cannot control that.  We control bonds and through them banking issues”.

The 1863 National Banking Act reinstated a private US central bank and Chase’s war bonds were issued.  Lincoln was re-elected the next year, vowing to repeal the act after he took his January 1865 oaths of office.  Before he could act, he was assassinated at the Ford Theatre by John Wilkes Booth.  Booth had major connections to the international bankers.  His granddaughter wrote This One Mad Act, which details Booth’s contact with “mysterious Europeans” just before the Lincoln assassination.

Following the Lincoln hit, Booth was whisked away by members of a secret society known as Knights of the Golden Circle (KGC).  KGC had close ties to the French Society of Seasons, which produced Karl Marx.  KGC had fomented much of the tension that caused the Civil War and President Lincoln had specifically targeted the group.  Booth was a KGC member and was connected through Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin to the House of Rothschild.  Benjamin fled to England after the Civil War. [12]

Nearly a century after Lincoln was assassinated for issuing Greenbacks, President John F. Kennedy found himself in the Eight Families’ crosshairs.  Kennedy had announced a crackdown on off-shore tax havens and proposed increases in tax rates on large oil and mining companies.  He supported eliminating tax loopholes which benefit the super-rich.  His economic policies were publicly attacked by Fortune magazine, the Wall Street Journal and both David and Nelson Rockefeller.  Even Kennedy’s own Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, who came from the UBS Warburg-controlled Dillon Read investment bank, voiced opposition to the JFK proposals. [13]

Kennedy’s fate was sealed in June 1963 when he authorized the issuance of more than $4 billion in United States Notes by his Treasury Department in an attempt to circumvent the high interest rate usury of the private Federal Reserve international banker crowd.  The wife of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was conveniently gunned down by Jack Ruby before Ruby himself died mysteriously in prison, told author A. J. Weberman in 1994, “The answer to the Kennedy assassination is with the Federal Reserve Bank.  Don’t underestimate that.  It’s wrong to blame it on Angleton and the CIA per se only.  This is only one finger on the same hand.  The people who supply the money are above the CIA”. [14]

Fueled by incoming President Lyndon Johnson’s immediate escalation of the Vietnam War, the US sank further into debt. Its citizens were terrorized into silence. If they could kill the President they could kill anyone.

The House of Rothschild

The Dutch House of Orange founded the Bank of Amsterdam in 1609 as the world’s first central bank.  Prince William of Orange married into the English House of Windsor, taking King James II’s daughter Mary as his bride.  The Orange Order Brotherhood, which recently fomented Northern Ireland Protestant violence, put William III on the English throne where he ruled both Holland and Britain.  In 1694 William III teamed up with the UK aristocracy to launch the private Bank of England.

The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street- as the Bank of England is known- is surrounded by thirty foot walls. Three floors beneath it the third largest stock of gold bullion in the world is stored. [15]

The Rothschilds and their inbred Eight Families partners gradually came to control the Bank of England. The daily London gold “fixing” occurred at the N. M. Rothschild Bank until 2004.  As Bank of England Deputy Governor George Blunden put it, “Fear is what makes the bank’s powers so acceptable.  The bank is able to exert its influence when people are dependent on us and fear losing their privileges or when they are frightened.”[16]

Mayer Amschel Rothschild sold the British government German Hessian mercenaries to fight against American Revolutionaries, diverting the proceeds to his brother Nathan in London, where N.M. (Nathan and Mayer) Rothschild & Sons was established.  Mayer was a serious student of Cabala and launched his fortune on money embezzled from William IX- royal administrator of the Hesse-Kassel region and a prominent Freemason.

Rothschild-controlled Barings bankrolled the Chinese opium and African slave trades. It financed the Louisiana Purchase.  When several states defaulted on its loans, Barings bribed Daniel Webster to make speeches stressing the virtues of loan repayment.  The states held their ground, so the House of Rothschild cut off the money spigot in 1842, plunging the US into a deep depression.  It was often said that the wealth of the Rothschilds depended on the bankruptcy of nations.  Mayer Amschel Rothschild once said, “I care not who controls a nation’s political affairs, so long as I control her currency”.

War didn’t hurt the family fortune either.  The House of Rothschild financed the Prussian War, the Crimean War and the British attempt to seize the Suez Canal from the French.  Nathan Rothschild made a huge financial bet on Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, while also funding the Duke of Wellington’s peninsular campaign against Napoleon. Both the Mexican War and the Civil War were goldmines for the family.

One Rothschild family biography mentions a London meeting where an “International Banking Syndicate” decided to pit the American North against the South as part of a “divide and conquer” strategy.  German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck once stated, “The division of the United States into federations of equal force was decided long before the Civil War.  These bankers were afraid that the United States…would upset their financial domination over the world.  The voice of the Rothschilds prevailed.” Rothschild biographer Derek Wilson says the family was the official European banker to the US government and strong supporters of the Bank of the United States. [17]

Family biographer Niall Ferguson notes a “substantial and unexplained gap” in private Rothschild correspondence between 1854-1860. He says all copies of outgoing letters written by the London Rothschilds during this Civil War period “were destroyed at the orders of successive partners”. [18]

French and British troops had, at the height of the Civil War, encircled the US.  The British sent 11,000 troops to Crown-controlled Canada, which gave safe harbor to Confederate agents.  France’s Napoleon III installed Austrian Hapsburg family member Archduke Maximilian as his puppet emperor in Mexico, where French troops massed on the Texas border.  Only an 11th-hour deployment of two Russian warship fleets by US ally Czar Alexander II in 1863 saved the United States from re-colonization. [19]

That same year the Chicago Tribune blasted, “Belmont (August Belmont was a US Rothschild agent and had a Triple Crown horse race named in his honor) and the Rothschilds…who have been buying up Confederate war bonds.”

Salmon Rothschild said of a deceased President Lincoln, “He rejects all forms of compromise.  He has the appearance of a peasant and can only tell barroom stories.”  Baron Jacob Rothschild was equally flattering towards the US citizenry. He once commented to US Minister to Belgium Henry Sanford on the over half a million Americans who died during the Civil War, “When your patient is desperately sick, you try desperate measures, even to bloodletting.”  Salmon and Jacob were merely carrying forth a family tradition.  A few generations earlier Mayer Amschel Rothschild bragged of his investment strategy, “When the streets of Paris are running in blood, I buy”. [20]

Mayer Rothschild’s sons were known as the Frankfurt Five.  The eldest – Amschel – ran the family’s Frankfurt bank with his father, while Nathan ran London operations.  Youngest son Jacob set up shop in Paris, while Salomon ran the Vienna branch and Karl was off to Naples.  Author Frederick Morton estimates that by 1850 the Rothschilds were worth over $10 billion. [21] Some researchers believe that their fortune today exceeds $100 trillion.

The Warburgs, Kuhn Loebs, Goldman Sachs, Schiffs and Rothschilds have intermarried into one big happy banking family.  The Warburg family- which controls Deutsche Bank and BNP- tied up with the Rothschilds in 1814 in Hamburg, while Kuhn Loeb powerhouse Jacob Schiff shared quarters with Rothschilds in 1785.  Schiff immigrated to America in 1865. He joined forces with Abraham Kuhn and married Solomon Loeb’s daughter.  Loeb and Kuhn married each others sisters and the Kuhn Loeb dynasty was consummated.  Felix Warburg married Jacob Schiff’s daughter. Two Goldman daughters married two sons of the Sachs family, creating Goldman Sachs.  In 1806 Nathan Rothschild married the oldest daughter of Levi Barent Cohen, a leading financier in London. [22]  Thus, Merrill Lynch super-bull Abby Joseph Cohen and Clinton Secretary of Defense William Cohen are likely descended from Rothschilds.

Today the Rothschild’s control a far-flung financial empire, which includes majority stakes in most world central banks.  The Edmond de Rothschild clan owns the Banque Privee SA in Lugano, Switzerland and the Rothschild Bank AG of Zurich.  The family of Jacob Lord Rothschild owns the powerful Rothschild Italia in Milan. They are founding members of the exclusive $10 trillion Club of the Isles – which controls corporate giants Royal Dutch Shell, Imperial Chemical Industries, Lloyds of London, Unilever, Barclays, Lonrho, Rio Tinto Zinc, BHP Billiton and Anglo American DeBeers. It dominates the world supply of petroleum, gold, diamonds, and many other vital raw materials. [23]

The Club of the Isles provides capital for George Soros’ Quantum Fund NV – which made a killing in 1998-99 destroying the currencies of Thailand, Indonesia and Russia.  Soros was a major shareholder at George W. Bush’s Harken Energy. Quantum NV operates from the Dutch island of Curacao, in the shadow of recently shuttered Royal Dutch/Shell and Exxon Mobil refineries.  Curacao was recently cited by an OECD Task Force on Money Laundering as a major drug money laundering nation.  The Club of Isles is led by the Rothschilds and includes Queen Elizabeth II and other wealthy European aristocrats and Black Nobility.  Fugitive Swiss financier and Mossad cutout Marc Rich, whose business interests were recently taken over by the Russian mafia Alfa Group, is also part of the Soros network. [24]

Ties to drug money are nothing new to the Rothschilds.  N. M. Rothschild & Sons was at the epicenter of the Bank of Credit & Commerce International (BCCI) scandal, but escaped the limelight when a warehouse full of documents conveniently burned to the ground around the time Rothschild-controlled Bank of England shut BCCI down.

Recent Rothschild endeavors include the backing of Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, control over Blackstone Group (see “…The 911 Short Selling Financial Scam”:, and the takeover of giant Swiss oil trader Glencore.

Perhaps the largest repository for Rothschild wealth today is Rothschilds Continuation Holdings AG – a secretive Swiss-based bank holding company.  By the late 1990s scions of the Rothschild global empire were Barons Guy and Elie de Rothschild in France and Lord Jacob and Sir Evelyn Rothschild in Britain. [25]

Evelyn was chairman of the Economist and a director at DeBeers and IBM UK.

Jacob backed Arnold Schwarzenegger’s California gubernatorial campaign. He took control of Khodorkovsky’s YUKOS oil shares just before the Russian government arrested him. In 2010 Jacob joined Rupert Murdoch in a shale oil extraction partnership in Israel through Genie Energy – a subsidiary of IDT Corporation. [26]

Within months, Sarah Palin had hired former IDT executive Michael Glassner as her chief of staff. [27]

Next Week: Part III: Knights of the Roundtable & The Illuminati

[1] The Temple & the Lodge. Michael Bagent & Richard Leigh. Arcade Publishing. New York. 1989. p.259

[2] Ibid. p.219

[3] Ibid. p.253

[4] Ibid. p.233

[5] The Robot’s Rebellion: The Story of the Spiritual Renaissance. David Icke. Gateway Books. Bath, UK. 1994. p.156

[6] Democracy for the Few. Michael Parenti. St. Martin’s Press. New York. 1977. p.51

[7] Fourth Reich of the Rich. Des Griffin. Emissary Publications. Pasadena, CA. 1978. p.171

[8] Ibid. p.173

[9] Rule by Secrecy: The Hidden History that Connects the Trilateral Commission, the Freemasons and the Great Pyramids. Jim Marrs. HarperCollins Publishers. New York. 2000. p.68

[10] The Secrets of the Federal Reserve. Eustace Mullins. Bankers Research Institute. Staunton, VA. 1983. p.179

[11] Human Race Get Off Your Knees: The Lion Sleeps No More. David Icke. David Icke Books Ltd. Isle of Wight. UK. 2010. p.92

[12] Marrs. p.212

[13] Idid. p.139

[14] Ibid p.141

[15] Icke. The Robot’s Rebellion. p.114

[16] Ibid. p.181

[17] Rothschild: The Wealth and Power of a Dynasty. Derek Wilson. Charles Schribner’s Sons. New York. 1988. p.178

[18] The House of Rothschild. Niall Ferguson. Viking Press New York 1998 p.28

[19] Marrs. p.215

[20] Ibid

[21] “What You Didn’t Know about Taxes and the Crown”. Mark Owen. Paranoia. #41. Spring 2006. p.66

[22] Marrs. p.63

[23] “The Coming Fall of the House of Windsor”. The New Federalist. 1994

[24] “The Secret Financial Network Behind ‘Wizard’ George Soros”. William Engdahl. Executive Intelligence Review. 11-1-96

[25] Marrs. p.86

[26] “Murdoch, Rothschild Invest in Israeli Oil Shale”. Jerusalem Post. November 22, 2010

[27] “Sarah Palin hires chief of staff for PAC”, Huffington Post. February 2011

Dean Henderson is the author of five books: Big Oil & Their Bankers in the Persian Gulf: Four Horsemen, Eight Families & Their Global Intelligence, Narcotics & Terror Network, The Grateful Unrich: Revolution in 50 Countries, Das Kartell der Federal Reserve, Stickin’ it to the Matrix & The Federal Reserve Cartel.  You can subscribe free to his weekly Left Hook column @

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15 thoughts on “The Federal Reserve Cartel: Part II: The Freemason BUS & The House of Rothschild

  1. “The most widespread Rothschild myth was that Nathan, after receiving news by carrier pigeon of Wellington’s victory at Waterloo, made a vast fortune speculating on the rise in British government securities. The reality, says Ferguson, was quite different. The Rothschilds’ couriers did alert them first to Napoleon’s defeat, but since they had bet big on a protracted military campaign, any quick gains in bonds after Waterloo were too small to offset the disruption to their business.

    Rothschild capital did soar–but over a much longer period. Nathan’s breakthrough was a deal to supply cash to Wellington’s army in 1814. Waging a high-risk campaign of exchange-rate transactions, bond-price speculations, and commissions, the family garnered huge profits from this governmental financing.”

    Posted by Andrew | June 9, 2011, 4:18 am
  2. Thank You. Truly Amazing! Keep up the good work.

    Posted by khalid malik | June 10, 2011, 3:17 am
  3. Great articles, Dean, like the previous one. I’m impacient to read the next part.

    I have a doubt that maybe you could clear up for me. I don’t understand how is it possible that Andrew Jackson could “kill the bank” while being a mason ( And it also seems like Ron Paul, who also wants to end the FED, is a high degree mason. How is that possible? Maybe the Elites want to end the USD to create a new world currency, and to do that they want to use Ron Paul. I think that makes sense. But how could Andrew Jackson finish with the Bank of the United States while being “one of them”?

    Posted by John | June 12, 2011, 4:56 pm
  4. The Rothschild Dynasty makes money off of both sides of every war. World War I never should have happened but the Rothschild banking cartels wanted money and power plus an excuse to build a league of nations!

    Posted by Pat | June 17, 2011, 4:16 pm
    • Rothschild bankers did not force these countries to take the money. They were obviously happy to supply funds to these govts to pursue these acts of murder.

      1) But how did the Rothschilds get so rich in the first place? Is it illegal today?

      2) Deutsche Bank was partly founder by a Jew but I do not know if it is controlled by Jews today and if it was, it was purchased by them.

      Jewish control of Deutsche Bank did not help them between 1933 and 1945:

      After Adolf Hitler came to power, instituting the Third Reich, Deutsche Bank dismissed its three Jewish board members in 1933. In subsequent years Deutsche Bank took part in the aryanization of Jewish-owned businesses: according to its own historians, the bank was involved in 363 such confiscations by November 1938.[21] During the war, Deutsche Bank incorporated other banks that fell into German hands during the occupation of Eastern Europe. Deutsche provided banking facilities for the Gestapo and loaned the funds used to build the Auschwitz camp and the nearby IG Farben facilities. Deutsche Bank revealed its involvement in Auschwitz in February 1999.[22] In December 1999 Deutsche, along with other major German companies, contributed to a US$5.2 billion compensation fund following lawsuits brought by Holocaust survivors.[23][24] The history of Deutsche Bank during the Second World War has been documented by independent historians commissioned by the Bank.

      3) Mark Rich makes me vomit but to say he is a Mossad cutout is a stretch.

      Posted by Silver Scumbag - Canada | July 6, 2012, 2:10 pm
  5. good post

    Posted by Rafael Langston | July 28, 2011, 2:39 am
  6. Reblogged this on Spartan of Truth and commented:
    Thanks Dean… Great work!

    Posted by spartanoftruth | August 3, 2013, 10:20 am
  7. Good article! Just want to offer a quick correction: Jack Ruby was not “shot” following the Kennedy assassination; he died of “natural” (yeah, right!) causes including stroke and cancer in prison.

    Posted by Deborah Collins | August 3, 2013, 6:42 pm
  8. Dean, you’d make an excellent Deputy Minister of Finance! Fuck yeah! Again, excellent work… very well detailed, and worthy of sharing! Peace!

    Posted by Kevin Brown | August 5, 2013, 1:12 pm
  9. What I heard, was Jack Ruby was actually infected with the cancer causing virus derived from that project (to kill Castro) that Lee Harvey was working on/with. Then, they hey sat Jack down for an xray, and left him there with the dam machine running full, for like 45 minutes… he got bad cancer shortly after and had nothing to lose killing Lee for setting him up (to keep him permanently quiet about the Kennedy assassination). Both of them were set up… to die and keep mum on the CIA shit storm. They even murdered Dorothy Killgallen (what’s my line) to snatch the notes she had on the whole reason Kennedy was killed… hundreds were murdered by the CIA to cover up the Zionist take-over of America.

    Posted by Kevin Brown | August 5, 2013, 1:18 pm
    • It’s my understanding that Ruby was injected with the cancer-causing virus that, yes, Lee Harvey Oswald and Dave Ferrie had participated in the development of with the original intent to assassinate Castro. More information on the cancer virus they created can be found in two excellent books, “Dr. Mary’s Monkey,” by Edward T. Haslam, and “Me & Lee,” by Judyth Vary Baker. This cancer project had chilling consequences for all of us which we are reaping today!

      Posted by debo52rah | August 5, 2013, 5:55 pm
  10. Ive just started the book! Brilliant… thankyou Mr Henderson
    When it comes to Castro… he is connected to David Rockefeller and CFR! Why do you think the CIA have never managed to bump him off (636 failed attempts?… 1 successful attempt on their own president!). Castro does Rockefellers bidding in misleading any South American leader who may plan to stick it to US and The Four Horseman… the late Hugo Chavez died after being initially misdiagnosed, then continually mistreated in a Havana hospital. Rumours it was Fidel who tipped off the whereabouts of Che Guvera.

    Posted by Danny Boy | August 7, 2013, 9:49 am
  11. Claims that the One-World conspiracy is “British”: british-conspiracy.html
    A graphic overview called One World Conspiracy – “British” or “Jewish”?Walter Lippmann on Colonel House and the League of Nations. Peter Myers, January 15, 2003; update February 12, 2003.
    You are at
    Lippman was one of a small group of activists trying to steer the politicians gathered at the Peace Conference of Versailles, towards World Government.

    There were two conspiracies behind this: an Anglo/Tory one (quigley.html), and a Socialist/Zionist one (opensoc.html); some people were members of both.

    The Anglo one wanted “one world” dominated by Britain (later, the US); the Socialist/Zionist one wanted Britain/the US subject to a World Court and World Army.

    The Balfour Declaration of 1917 marked a turning point, whereby the Anglo/Tory faction was co-opted to Zionism. Arnold Toynbee, opposed to the Balfour Declaration, was relegated to obscurity by the Zionist media. Lord Northcliffe, a Tory opposed to Zionism, was forced to cede control of the Times of London: toolkit3.html.

    The Anglo/Tory faction has become the Tory/Zionist faction.

    A century later, George W. Bush represents the Tory-Zionist faction, while Bill Clinton represented the Socialist one. Clinton’s cabinet was Jewish, but Internationalist (Western Marxist, i.e. Trotskyist) rather than Zionist (beria.html).

    The Socialist/Zionist camp, a century ago, whilst opposing the Anglo/Tory camp, was divided into those who wanted Israel at the centre of world values, and those more Internationalist. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, this division has intensified.

    High-profile activists in the Socialist/Zionist camp included H. G. Wells, John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, Israel Zangwill, Jacob Schiff and Bernard Baruch – of these, Wells and Dewey were the only non-Jews: wells-lenin-league.html.

    Lippman shows how “Colonel” House, liasing with Lord (Sir Edward) Grey of the Anglo conspiracy, persuaded Wilson to join World War I. For background on House see house-schiff.html.

    Lippman wanted the League of Nations to be a World Government with a World Army and a World Court. His book Men of Destiny is a collection of articles on these themes, originally published in various journals including Foreign Affairs.

    The U.S. Senate rejected some of the clauses of the League of Nations Covenant, on the ground that US armed forces, and US courts, would thereby be subject to a higher, international, authority.

    Walter Lippmann, Men of Destiny, Macmillan, New York 1927.

    {p. 112} An Early Estimate of Mr. McAdoo

    IF the Republicans do not nominate a man who can interest the people now voting for Johnson, and if the Democrats nominate McAdoo, it will be a hot summer for the Republican candidates; and about September fifteenth Mr. Will Hays will begin to sleep badly. For McAdoo is a little like Lloyd George. He knows not only what the owners of votes are thinking now, but what they will be excited about a few weeks from now.

    {p. 118} His speeches on foreign affairs, especially in the early stages of the Treaty debate, are of this order. On the Fourth of July, 1919, for example, he was

    {p. 120} arguing for the Treaty: “Separate the League of Nations from the Treaty and it would be utterly impossible to enforce the Treaty. …” That was the time, July, 1919, when nobody had read the Treaty and everybody liked it because it was hard on the Huns. A year later Mr. McAdoo was saying something to the effect that God won the war but the devil won the peace. There had been the beginning of a radical change in public opinion. A beginning was enough. A hint is enough for McAdoo, but he needs the hint.

    Thus in recent interviews he has been courageous and straightforward on contentious questions affecting civil liberty, Russia, the Palmer injunction, and the whole paraphernalia of the Red hysteria. …

    June, 1920.

    {p. 120} WILSON AND HOUSE

    THESE two volumes {footnote: “The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.” Arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour. Vol. I. Behind the Political Curtain, 1912-1925. Vol. II. From Neutrality to War, 1915-1917.} tell Colonel House’s story of his association with Woodrow Wilson through the period of American neutrality. They end with a scene at the White House after the delivery of the war message; the President, his family, and the Colonel are alone together.

    The two friends had spent the day doing nothing except kill time until the President was called to the Capitol. House set down in his diary that he could see signs of nervousness beneath the President’s apparent calm. “In the morning he told me he was determined not to speak after three o’clock, believing it would make a bad impression – an impression that he was unduly pressing matters. I thought differently and persuaded him that he should hold

    {p. 121} himself ready to address Congress whenever that body indicated their readiness to hear him. It turned out that he began to speak at twenty minutes to nine and finished in about thirty-two minutes. I timed him carefully.” … It was like the two men, the one in such an agony of doubt over the awful responsibility of the decision into which he had been pushed that he snatched at a pretext that might allow him to delay; the other imperturbable and aware of the immediate requirements of the occasion even to setting down in his diary that he had timed the President carefully and that he spoke about thirty-two minutes. Colonel House did not put down in his diary that night how he felt about the entry of the United tates into a great European war, except to say that it seemed to him that “Wilson did not have a true conception of the path he was blazing.” It was House’s business to be calm and so he simply wrote that they had dined early, at half past six, and that they talked of everything except the matter in hand, that when they returned from the Capitol the family gathered in the Oval Room, where House showed Wilson a clipping from some paper, and said to Wilson he was like Mazzini. “I could see the President was relieved that the tension was over and the die cast. I knew this would happen.”

    Even if the two men had not had such different temperaments, they would have felt differently on that fateful day. To Wilson the declaration of war was the tragic failure of his own hopes; to House

    {p. 122} it was a step to which he was thorougnly adjusted, for he had long regarded war as probable, as necessary, and as a great opportunity. Wilson hated the decision with all his soul; for about two weeks he fought the matter out in his own mind, absolutely alone. As late as the day before he went to Congress he told Frank Cobb of his horror and cried out to him: “If there is any alternative, for God’s sake, let’s take it!” House, on the other hand, was not beset by these doubts. He remained in New York during Wilson’s agony, and did not go to Washington till the decision was made. He found when Wilson showed him the text of the message that “no address he has yet made pleases me more than this one.”

    Although they were associated so closely, it is evident that these two men felt very differently about the war. Wilson, in spite of the complexity of his character and his mind, was moved by the old American feeling that America is a new land which must not be entangled with Europe. The sympathy of his mind was pro-Allies though chastened by a certain irony about their moral pretensions, a suspicion of their motives, and a conviction that unfortunately they too were mad; in this period his heart was always neutral and non-European. His real judgment he expressed several times, to the horror not only of the Allied spokesmen but of Colonel House; it was that the war arose out of obscure causes that were hatched in a sinister system and a tortuous

    {p. 123} diplomacy. Wilson never accepted the official propaganda even when it blew the hottest; he never respected it, and could hardly bear to listen to it. What he wanted above all things was to keep out of the hideous mess. House, on the other hand, was much too practical a politician to permit himself to stray into such a wilderness of unusable truth, even if he had not really wanted the Allies to win. House wanted those very things to which Wilson ultimately gave his official consent and about half his soul’s desire. He did not share Wilson’s reluctance and foreboding, and he appears in these volumes, perhaps a little more consistently than he was in fact, as the protagonist of what might be called the British liberal imperialist view as against the instinctive American isolationist view of Woodrow Wilson.

    Unfortunately this record does not contain Wilson’s side of the correspondence with House, nor of course any account of Wilson’s feelings about their relationship. It is like listening to one side of a broken conversation on the telephone, and not quite even that, for the record we have is what House put down and Mr. Seymour selected. It is plain to me, however, from House’s letters that he did not press very hard on their differences, and that their association was friendly but careful. There are hints occasionally which lead one to think that Wilson would not have tolerated urgency from House or from any one else. Thus in these papers Mr. Sey-

    {p. 124} mour gives great weight to a letter written by House to Wilson on July 19 1915 in which he says: “If war comes with Germany, it will be because of our unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or less impotent to do her harm.” But there is no evidence that House ever made an issue of this crucial matter, nor that he gave it the emphasis at the time which Mr. Seymour gives it by quoting the sentence at the head of Chapter I of the second volume.

    I am inclined to believe, therefore, that although this was the closest political friendship of Woodrow Wilson’s life, it was a friendship at some distance and always of a certain fragility. Wilson told House more than he told his Cabinet, and certainly no other adviser in this period had so much of his confidence. But there were reservations, and there does not seem ever to have been the intimacy of two friends who can say anything to each other without misunderstanding. The letters are friendly, but they are the letters of one statesman to another. They leave me feeling that House had to consider carefully how he would approach Wilson.

    House had a more coherent, even if it was a simpler, view of the war and of the part he wished Wilson to play; he was not tormented by Wilson’s hatred of war, by his dreadful sense that victory is a snare, by his desire to wrench himself free from the encompassing of a tragic fate. House was businesslike about the business at hand, and did not look long

    {p. 125} into the bottomless pit; thought and feeling and the action he recommended were worldly and of a piece. But in Wilson there was an unworldliness of pity and doubt and high contempt that prevented him from agreeing wholly with much that circumstances forced him to do. The figure of Wilson is dim in these pages, but here and there we catch a glimpse of him as he struggles very much alone against the advancing chaos. Now and then the real future is illuminated for him by a flash of insight. But these prophecies only cause him anguish, for they show him how different is the path he is compelled to take from that which he thinks he ought to take.

    Colonel House served the President in many different roles – as friend, adviser, scout, observer, secret agent, political manipulator, negotiator, and sifter of information and opinion. But his main task was to accommodate the personal attitude of Wilson to the exigencies of the war. For Wilson stood aloof not only from its detail but from the official premises and official criteria of his time. He wished to keep the country out of the war. For that reason he wished to end the war. He did not wish to fight in order merely to vindicate that part of our neutral rights which Germany was violating. If he had to fight, he wished to justify war by some objective which vas greater than the war aims of the Allies.

    {p. 126} The aloofness of Wilson from the pressure of those who usually surround the head of a state helped him to his uncanny understanding of what the mass of American people really believed about the war. It is no wonder they reelected him in 1916 in the belief that he had kept the country out of the war in Europe, nor that they elected the Republicans in 1920 because they promised to keep the country out of Europe and another war in Europe. In the period of neutrality Wilson saw more clearly than any living man what the country really wanted. He was in sympathy with the country. He was very much alone, and yet his intuitions were those of the mass of unseen and non-vocal Americans, once you looked below the views which were acquired and imposed by German frightfulness and Allied propaganda and the personal and social connections of the upper classes on the Eastern seaboard.

    Colonel House, too, had a certain initial American suspicion of Europe, but he was a much more sociable man than Wilson, and he was at once more trustful of, and more sensitive to, the upper officialized opinion. He became in a sense the honest broker between Wilson, who longed for peace without entanglement, and the people on both sides of the Atlantic who had set themselves to draw the United States into the war. The formula which House evolved first during his negotiations with Grey in London early in 1916 became later the Wilson policy of a war to found a League of Nations; it

    {p. 127} was at bottom a compromise formula to satisfy both Wilson’s instincts and the demands of the pro-Allies. House proposed to buy the assent of the Allies to a conference to end the war by offering to enter the war on the side of the Allies if Germany refused the conference or insisted upon a victorious peace. As I read the record, Wilson never fully agreed to this proposal in so far as it involved a promise to enter the war. But he did take from it the principle that American influence should be used as a makeweight against aggression and a stabilizer of peace. Thus it came about that when he entered the war, he did not think of himself as primarily engaged in a war against Germany on the side of the Allies. He thought he was using the force of the United States to tame Germany and to restrain the Allies in order that there might be established a permanent conference to prevent war.

    In these volumes we see the origins of what came to be known as the Wilson policy. We can see how the President began to formulate an ideal future as the pressure of events forced him into a course of action which he detested. And in it all Colonel House appears as the man who suggested to Wilson how he could do, in a way which nearly satisfied his conscience, what immeasurably great events were compelling him against his will to do. Psychologist might say that House supplied Wilson with the rationalizations by means of which Wilson was able to bow to a destiny that was overbearing him, and

    {p. 128} even ultimately to sow the seed of a triumph that may make him immortal.


    The machinery by which Colonel House kept in touch with the war was so simple that it might be called primitive. He had direct contact with Grey at the British Foreign Office and with Bernstorff. He had only a casual contact with the French Government or with the Italian or the Russian. He had access, of course, to what the State Department could learn about the war, but that was admittedly not much from the point of view of high politics. He had a useful and illuminating correspondence with Gerard at Berlin, and much less illuminating correspondellce with other American Ambassadors. He went to England, Germany, and France several times and had interviews with the leading statesmen. But whell all is said and done, it was with the British alone, and then only with a certain section of the British, and with this section not in fullest confidence, that he had a continuous discussion.

    With Grey at the British Foreign Office he used a secret code; he had the closest personal contact with the head of the British Secret Service in America, and by this means a channel of communication was opened which passed by the British Embassy in Washington, the State Department, and the American Embassy in London. He had no

    {p. 129} comparable relations with any of the other Allies, and with the Germans he had only a friendly but cautious contact with Bernstorff, who was himself considerably an outsider in the conduct of foreign policy. His friendships in Britain were with men like Grey, Bryce, Plunkett, and to a certain extent Balfour, but there is no evidence that they told him all they knew, or all that he had under the circumstances perhaps a fair right to know. And it is plain that the imperial statesmen like Curzon, and Lloyd George himself, and Milner, and the permanent but dominating Foreign office, were outside the orbit of House, and quite content to leave the persuasion of Wilson and House to those British liberals who most nearly talked the language that Americans understand.

    The objective proof of this is to be found in the fact that although House negotiated with Grey in 1916, making a tentative offer to enter the war on the side of the Allies, Grey never explained to House that the Allies were bound to each other by a series of secret treaties that made acceptance of Wilson’s conditions impossible. Grey’s letter to House explaining his moral scruples about considering the offer is one of the least informing documents that any one could have written under the circumstances. There is no doubt that the negotiations of 1916 were conducted in the dark, and that neither Wilson nor House seems to have known fully the inner diplomatic history of those days. Mr. Seymour in a

    {p. 130} footnote (Vol. I, p. 443) states that Mr. Balfour explained the details of the Italian Treaty to President Wilson on April 30, 1917. That was rather late in the day. Nobody explained that treaty or any other to House when he was in London discussing so important a matter as the entrance of the United States into the war. It is impossible, therefore, to feel that even so able a man as House, with so great a gift as his for friendships, is even a partially adequate substitute for an effective diplomatic service.


    The secret negotiations of February, 1916, were the most important diplomatic effort that House undertook in the period covered by these volumes. The conclusions of a conference on February 14 were embodied in a memorandum written by Sir Edward Grey which is dated February 22. The substance of the proposal as made by House is as follows:

    “Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a conference should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept this proposal and should Germany refuse it, the United States would enter the war against Germany.

    “Colonel House cxpressed the opinion that, if

    {p. 131} such a conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavorable to the Allies; and if it failed to secure peace, the United States would leave the conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germanv was unreasonable. … ”

    That is the way the proposal read when House left London. On March 6, he arrived in Washington and went over the memorandum with President Wilson. Two days later, on March 8, Wilson wrote a telegram to Grey for House to sign which read as follows:

    “I reported to the President the general conclusions of our conference of the 14th of February, and in the light of those conclusions he authorizes me to say that, so far as he can speak for the future actions of the United States, he agrees to the memorandum with which you have furnished me, with only this correction: that the word ‘probably’ be added after the word ‘would’ and before the word ‘leave’ in line number nine.”

    Thus, after Wilson had amended it, the proposal read that “the United States would probably enter the war against Germany,” and not that “the United States would enter the war against Germany”; that “the United States would probably leave the conference as a belligerent” and not that “the United States would leave it as a belligerent.” In a foot-

    {p. 133} note to the account of this incident (Vol. II, p. 21) Mr. Seymour says that:

    “The value of the offer was in no way lessened by the use of the word ‘probably,’ which was a conventional covering expression common in diplomatic documents. Since the power to declare war resides in Congress and since the President shares with the Senate the control of foreign policy, it would have been impossible for Wilson to give a categorical guaranty of the future actions of the United States. As a matter of practice, however, the President can determine the question of peace and war, and the expression of his intention appears here in the strongest permissible form.”

    It is hard for me to believe that the British Foreign Office in 1916 interpreted the insertion of the word “probably” as Mr. Seymour interprets it in 1925. Assuming that British statesmen understood the subtleties of our constitutional system, it seems to me that they must nevertheless have regarded the President’s use of the word “probably” as a reservation on the President’s own action as well as on that of Congress. The President did not say categorically: “I will recommend to Congress that the United States enter the war,” as he might have done if that was what he was intending to do. The use of the word “probably” reserved liberty of action for Wilson, and so the Allies must have understood

    {p. 133} it. It must be remembered that at the very time these secret negotiations were in progress, the President was being reviled in the pro-Allied press of America and Europe as pro-German, pacifist and splneless; and that just before House talked to Grey, the State Department accepted publicly, though temporarily, the German position on the arming of merchant vessels. I do not see how it is possible to suppose that the Allies took the word “probably” as a “conventional covering expression,” and not as a weasel word which radically altered the sense of the House proposal.

    Once you reject Mr. Seymour’s explanation and take the Wilson amendment as meaning what it appears to say, you arrive at this result: House proposed a conference which would either obtain moderate terms for the Allies or American assistance in the war; Wilson, on the other hand, proposed a conference to end the war with no commitment that he would even try to enter the war if the conference failed. I do not believe that House and Wilson clearly understood each other here; in this incident we can see that in spite of their apparent agreement they started from different premises about the war, and that their minds worked differently as to the American objective. It is necessary to add that there is every reason to think that the Allies had a truer realization of Wilson’s attitude than House who, in the stress of working for a great plan, did not distinguish sharply between what he hoped

    {p. 134} would happen and what President Wilson wished to have happen.

    If Mr. Seymour’s interpretation were correct the incident would be a crucial one in the history of the war and in the history of American politics. As yet we have only two versions, that of Colonel House, and the gracious but highly officialized account of Lord Grey’s “Twenty-Five Years.” (Vol. II, p. 126 et seq.) We do not know Wilson’s version, and we do not know what the Allied statesmen thought of it all. We do know enough to be wary of Mr. Seymour’s definite verdict that “House had shown them how, by merely raising a beckoning hand, they might have the assurance either of a peace of justice or a victory won with American assistance.” (Vol. II, p. 203.) The implied charge against the Allied statesmen is a very grave one, and no doubt in the course of time they will answer it.

    If Mr. Seymour were right, the matter would be no less grave from the point of view of America. For he insists that a President of the United States offered in secret to commit this country to enter a war in order to achieve a certain diplomatic settlement in Europe. For myself I do not believe that there is any evidence that Woodrow Wilson did anything of the kind, and I am personally convinced that the incident is much simpler to interpret than Mr. Seymour’s version implies. I give my own interpretation for what it is worth, recalling again that we do not know the whole story. I think Wilson

    {p. 135} wished above all to avoid war. I think he would have been willing to have almost any peace in Europe if he could keep America out of war. I think he saw that if once he could induce the belligerents to begin talking that they never could resume fighting. He was willing to try any device, including the House negotiations, that might bring on a conference, provided it did not commit him to entering the war. And I think that is exactly the sense in which the Allies understood it, and that is exactly why they ignored it. They had no promise from Wilson that really counted. And in a conference at that time their divergence of aims would have come to the surface, the secret treaties would have seriously damaged their moral standing, and the coalition might have broken up. Finally and above all they knew that if they maintained their blockade, Germany would either starve or resume submarine warfare. If Germany starved, Wilson’s restraining influence would be eliminated in the peace conference; if Germany resumed warfare, Wilson would be driven to enter the war without conditions.

    If this interpretation is correct, the negotiations were a failure not because the Allies were too stupid to seize a great opportunity, as Mr. Seymour suggests, or too high-minded, as Lord Grey suggests. The negotiations failed because Wilson had nothing to negotiate with: he would promise nothing and he would threaten nothing. He would not promise to go to war with Germany and he would not threaten

    {p. 136} to enforce American rights against the Allies. The offer inspired neither hope nor fear. And when empires are at war it is not possible to deflect them with insubstantial proposals.

    And yet out of these same negotiations grew that advocacy of a League of Nations which may yet cause Woodrow Wilson to be numbered among the great benefactors of mankind. As Wilson understood the House-Grey negotiations they were an attempt to provoke a conference, end the war, and thus extricate the United States from an otherwise insoluble difficulty. The failure of these negotiations seems to have made clear to Wilson that the United States was caught in circumstances which allowed it no escape from the fate of the rest of the world. During the spring which followed the winter’s failure he seems finally to have concluded that neutrality was untenable for the United States in a great war, and that the philosophy of isolation would have to be revised. He still fought against the practical consequences and hoped that he might avoid participation in this war. But he realized that as the world grew more and more interdependent no succeeding President would be able to maintain neutrality even as long as he had.

    It was with a foreboding that even he might not be able to escape that he publicly espoused the idea

    {p. 137} of a League of Nations in his great speech of May 27, 1916. He had then come to the conclusion that if he was forced into the war all he could hope to obtain as compensation for such immeasurable evil was an organized peace. Wilson was determined not to fight a war merely for American neutral rights as against the submarine. For he realized that those rights could not be vindicated by war, and the event has fully borne him out. The treaty of peace does not in any way mention the rights of neutrals against submarines and the submarine to-day is exactly the same instrument of frightfulness as it was in 1917. When the victory was won and peace was made, the victorious Allies did not trouble even to pass a resolution against submarines. Wilson felt that to enter the war merely for the sake of our rights would not be worth the suffering and the cost.

    He set himself, therefore, the noble task of establishing some permanent benefit as the objective in case the United States was forced into the war. It was in that way, if I read the record rightly, that he turned to the League of Nations. Other men before him had advocated the idea. The greatness of Wilson lay in his prophetic understanding that this was the one good he might be able to promote and defend in the face of the oncoming disaster. It was the one compensation, it was the one reasonable ideal, it was the one moral justification, it was the one balm to his conscience for the plunging of a great people into the red madness of Europe.

    {p. 138} If Wilson had prepared for the ordeal of war in practice as he prepared for it in principle, his claim to supreme greatness among statesmen would not be open to dispute. But the record of these memoirs shows that he and House up to 1917 were dependent for their knowledge of the war largely upon what belligerent statesmen chose to tell them. They had no secret service and no diplomatic service which could inform them either as to the secret engagements or the secret purposes of the European governments. And they never learned before the declaration of war that there were in existence solemn and binding agreements which were bound in large measure to prevent the making of such a just and conciliatory settlement as they needed for the foundation of a successful League of Nations. Therefore, they missed the golden opportunity of exacting pledges from the Allies for an American peace. The Allies had to buy the help of Rumania and of Italy. But they got American help for nothing, and by that disastrous oversight the whole grand purpose of Wilson was almost wrecked at Paris.

    The fame of House will depend of course upon the fame of Wilson, just as Wilson’s fame will depend upon the success of the League of Nations. House, it seems to me, is bound to share in whatever fame Wilson finally achieves, for it is evident even

    {p. 139} from the scanty records available that he helped more than any other man, and that he helped decisively, to commit Wilson to the cause of the League. It seems to me of slight consequence whether or not the fulsome judgments of his biographer are accepted by posterity. Even the claims of the biographer which are bound to embarrass the Colonel’s friends are of little permanent importance.

    Time, and a sense of reality, and a fuller knowledge, will change the perspective in which these letters and diaries are set, and there will emerge, I feel sure, in place of the picture of a man who directed destiny, the picture of a man who stood faithfully at Wilson’s side against a destiny that overwhelmed them both, but in that vain and often blind resistance did help to kindle a light for the generations to come.

    April, 1926.

    {p. 140} BORAH


    IN due course Senator Borah has been made Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He has come into this high estate not by election of the people or by choice of his own party but under the rule of seniority. He has outlasted his predecessors. I mention this fact because it establishes his independence at the outset. …

    {p. 156} The attempt of a legislature to control foreign policy is in the nature of things an attempt to make the tail wag the dog. Congress alone, for example, has the power to declare war. But the President has the power to make war and to put Congress in the position where it must either back him up or haul down the flag. The Executive who believes a war is necessary can create a situation where Congress really has no choice. He can occupy ports, shoot off the cannon, and get himself embroiled so that no patriotic legislature will refuse to help him out. It is something of a fiction to say that Congress alone can declare war. It is nearer the truth to say that Congress has a theoretical right to decide whether a war which has already begun shall be continued. But Congress has no power to say how long the war shall be continued; for the President can make an armistice when he chooses.

    The power of the Senate over treaties is no less elusive. In theory no covenant binding the action of the United States can be made without its consent in fact every President makes decisions which are binding without the consent of the Senate. He may do this by exchange of notes, by gentlemen’s agreements, by the mere fact that when the President does one thing something else follows by the logic of necessity. The intervention of the Senate when formal treaties are presented to it occurs in the

    {p. 157} presence of a mountain of accomplished facts. The Senate can tinker a little with the text, but as a general practice it must take it or leave it. And even if the Senate takes the treaty, the real meaning of the treaty eludes the Senate because the power of interpretation and administration remains with the Executive. “Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws,” said Bishop Hoadley, “it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes.” …

    {p. 162} “THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR”

    DURING the war it was generally believed that the way to prevent war in the future was to make war swiftly and unitedly on all future Germanys. Theodore Roosevelt, as early as September, 1914, had urged the formation of what he called an international posse comitalus against “outlaw” nations. This same suggestion was adopted subsequently, under the name of a League to Enforce Peace, by Mr. Taft, Senator Lodge, and others. In the spring of 1916 President Wilson was publicly converted to the idea that a war of aggression was the concern not merely of the attacking nation and its victim, but of all civilized nations, that an attack on one was an attack on all, that a breach of the peace should in the future be answered by united enforcement of peace. It was in this context of thought and feeling that a Chicago lawyer,

    {p. 163} Mr. S. O. Levinson, launched his proposal for “the outlawry of war.” {footnote: S. O. LEVINS0N: “The Legal Status of War,” in The New Republic, March 9, 1918; cf. also JOHN DEWEY: “Morals and the Conduct of Status,” in The New Republic, March 23, 1918.}

    {And yes, Levinson would probably be a Jewish name}

    {p. 164} Political leaders had not yet divided along partisan lines, and with two million American men on their way to French battlefields none expressed any dislike of European entanglements. Mr. Levinson was safe in assuming that what the United States was then doing, in March, 1918, it would in the event of another aggiession do again. Therefore, it was naturally in the current of public opinion for Mr. Levinson to argue that the Roosevelt-TaftLodge-Wilson theory of a League to Enforce Peace would be strengthened and clarified if war itself were declared a punishable crime in international law. There would then be no hesitant neutrality, no doubt about the right and duty of all nations to join in the war against a nation like Germany. Mr. Levinson’s phrase, therefore, seemed less novel then than it does now. For in the mood of those days he had merely found a rather picturesque name for the generally accepted theory of a war against war.

    The same idea was, of course, taken to Paris by President Wilson. But of Mr. Levinson’s phrase nothing much was heard until a year afterward when the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was printed. Then the phrase reappeared

    {p. 164} in a speech delivered by the late Senator Philander C. Knox. But there had begun a radical change of meaning. The phrase which Mr. Levinson had coined to clarify the purposes of a League to Enforce Peace was now the name of a substitute for the League of Nations. For Mr. Knox, who was the acknowledged leader of the irreconcilables in the Senate, their most courageous guide and their shrewdest counselor, was not content with a purely destructive attack on President Wilson’s project. He acknowledged the need of a substitute, and he started out with Mr. Levinson’s help to construct a new plan for peace.

    In Senator Knox’s first speech, delivered the first of March, 1919, the “outlawry of war” is still associated with the idea of a League to Enforce Peace. Mr. Knox is definitely opposed to the League of Nations, but he continues to discuss “a league,” based upon a “constitution” which is to call upon “the powers signatory to enforce” the decrees and awards of an international court, “as against unwilling states, by force, economic pressure, or otherwise.” However, within a few months, concurrently with the rising tide of American opinion against the League and all covenants to use force, Mr. Knox and Mr. Levinson changed their minds. In formulating their “plan to outlaw war,” they cast aside not only the League, but a league as well, and deprived their international court of any power to enforce its decrees.

    {p. 165} After the death of Senator Knox the outlawry of war seemed for a time to be forgotten. President Harding alluded to it at the opening of the Washington Conference, but nothing was done with hi suggestion. Then early in 1923 Senator Borah adopted the slogan and the idea, and became the political leader of what is now an organized campaign. Mr. Borah is advocating the “outlawry of war” and the defeat of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

    We find then that the phrase was first employed in order to strengthen a league before there was a League. It was used to defeat the League after there was a League, and to advocate an international court before there was a Court. Now that the Court has been created, it is being used to defeat the Court, and to advocate another court which does not exist.

    The phrase is associated, then, as a matter of political history, with a perfect record of irreconcilability. But this association is, I think, personal and accidental. It was a chance happening that Senator Knox adopted the phrase in his attack on the League. It is a chance happening that Senator Borah uses the phrase in his attack on the Court. For there are many devoted adherents to the League, beginning with Lord Robert Cecil, who would like to find a way to define war and outlaw it. There are many

    {p. 166} who support the existing Court, beginning with Mr. Elihu Root, who also would like to outlaw war. {Root was one of those who set up the CFR} The phrase is as appropriate in Lord Robert Cecil’s mouth as it was in Mr. Knox’s, in Mr. Root’s as in Mr. Borah’s. It is only an accident of irreconcilable politics in the United States Senate which has identified “the outlawry of war” with active opposition to every established institution for the prevention of war.

    How accidental is this association may be judged from the position of Senator Borah. Not once, but many times, Mr. Borah is on record against the League because it is alleged to be a superstate which will destroy our national sovereinty. But this belief about the League does not deter Mr. Borah from employing his eloquence to deride the existing World Court because it has no power to take jurisdiction in all international disputes. Because there has not been formulated by world conference an authoritative code of law covering the matters about which nations dispute! Mr. Borah’s confirmed objections to a superstate sleep comfortably in the same mind with his demand for a Supreme Court of the World, modeled on our Federal Supreme Court, having its gigantic powers in conflicts between states, including, if Mr. Borah’s analogy means anything, the power to annul acts of parliaments, including acts of our own Congress!

    A position so illogical must be a political accident.

    {p. 167} There can be no necessary connection between the outlawry of war and the orthodox philosophy of the irreconcilables. There is, rather, a deep contradiction between them, a contradiction so deep that it has procluced the extraordinary spectacle of Mr. Borah objecting to a superstate and at the same time demanding a supercourt, and a superconference to legislate a supercode. We have nevertheless to discuss the outlawry of war in this setting, as a project for world peace offered by the irreconcilable opponents of the existing League and the existing Court. With proposals to work for the outlawry of war through existing international organizations, such as Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Root have entertained, we are not here concerned. We are faced with the fact that the American campaign for the outlawry of war is led by men who have fought and will continue to fight not only the League and the Court, but even such conventions as were reached at the Washington Conference.

    Narrow is the path and straight is the gate for those who wish to join Mr. Borah’s campaign for the outlawry of war. The idea of attempting to make war a crime still belongs to men of all shades of opinion. But the “outlawry of war,” as a political label, is now the name of what purports to be a comprehensive plan of world peace, fundamentally different from any yet attempted, and in the test of action, antagonistic to all.

    {p. 168} III

    The Borah plan for abolishing war is embodied in Senate Resolution 441 introduced on February 14, 1923. The plan has three parts: first there is to be a universal treaty making war “a public crime under the law of nations” and “a solemn agreement or treaty to bind” every nation “to indict and punish its own international war breeders or instigators and war profiteers”;

    Second, there is to be “created and adopted … a code of international law of peace based upon equality and justice between nations, amplified and expanded and adapted and brought down to date”;

    Third, there is to be created “a judicial substitute for war” or (if existing, in part adapted and adjusted) in the form or nature of an international court, modeled on our Federal Supreme Court in its jurisdiction over controversies between our sovereign states, such court to possess affirmative jurisdiction to hear and decide all purely international controversies as defined by the code, or arising under treaties.”

    This is the scheme which in Mr. Borah’s opinion is to abolish war. This is the scheme which is to do what the League and Court, in his opinion, cannot do. This is the scheme which has such promise of effectiveness, in the minds of the advocates of the outlawry of war, that they are determined to defeat not only American adherence to the League, but the

    {p. 169} modest proposal of President Harding to adhere to the Court. It is this scheme, they say, or none. There is no other way to end war.

    What they are relying upon fundamentally is not their court and their code, but the treaty “outlawing war.” They believe that this slogan has the power to arouse and then to crystallize mankind’s abhorrence of war. They believe a declaration that war is a crime would legalize pacifism throughout the world, and deprive the war spirit of its legality and authority. The war-maker would then have to be the conscientious objector, the pacifist would be under the shelter of law and order and conservatism. Once this radical reversal of patriotic and legal values had taken place, war would be almost unorganizable, because pacifism would be the authoritative morality of the nations.

    We are dealing then primarily with a moral crusade in favor of complete moral disarmament. If the propaganda were successful, machinery for keeping the peace would not be very necessary, because the propaganda itself, so its sponsors argue, would destroy the will to war. Once nations had learned not to wish to fight, keeping the peace would be an easy matter. Therefore, the advocates of the plan, except for controversial purposes, have given little thought to, and place little emphasis upon, their project for a new court and a new code.

    Nevertheless, before men commit themselves universally to a pacifism so radical that it destroys the

    {p. 170} patriotic code which they are accustomed to associate withl their security and their national destiny, it is likely that they will inquire very closely into Mr. Borah’s machinery for keeping the peace. He will have to prove, I think, that his court and his code effectively promise to prevent war, if he is to induce mankind to disarm, first morally and then physically. Men will scrutinize rather closely this new code and this new court under which, having rendered themselves militarily impotent, they are to live.


    It is clearly easier to arouse large audiences to a denunciation of war in general than it is to persuade them to agree on the principles of a code. Men agree that war is a horror and a crime. They do not agree easily on the fixing of boundaries, the right to secede, the right of revolution, the control of raw materials, access to the sea, the rights of minorities, tariffs, immigration, the status of colonies, the rights of property. They do not agree easily about what constitute, in Mr. Borah’s words, “purely international controversies.” People are fairly unanimous against war. They are wholly unanimous in their professions of love for “equality and justice.” But they quarrel fearfully about what is just and what is equal. They are divided over the general principles which ought to decide great issues. They are even more divided over the inter-

    {p. 171} pretation of the facts in specific cases under general principles.

    Shall boundaries be determined by nationality or by economic geography? May Ireland secede from the Empire, may Ulster secede from Ireland, may three counties secede from Ulster? Is revolution permitted? Is revolution assisted by a foreign power permitted? Are the natural resources of undeveloped countries the property of the natives to have and to hold as they see fit, or have European and American nations rights in them, and how are those rights to be apportioned? Do nations which happen to block the access of other nations to the sea owe any duty to landlocked peoples, which ought to limit their sovereign rights over their own ports and railroads? Are national and religious minorities, whether they be Germans in Poland or Negroes in Mississippi, to be protected by any rule of international law? Is the tariff a “purely” domestic question? Is prohibition “applied to foreign ships” a domestic question? Is discrimination against immigrants a domestic question? Have colonies the right to revolt? May Mexico confiscate American oil property? May the United States confiscate sealed liquor on foreign ships?

    Now when Senator Borah proposes to create a code of international law as a substitute for war he must mean, if he means anything, a code which establishes legal rules covering such questions. But who is to make such a code? Mr. Borah’s resolution

    {p. 172} does not tell us. The Kllox-Levinson plan calls for a world conference to perform the feat, and other advocates speak of a conventtion of experts and jurists. Little attempt is ever made to describe how this code is to be made. The point is passed over lightly with some reference to the codification and creation of international law.

    But the word “creation” is perhaps the biggest word in the Englisn language. To create a code “based on equality and justice” is to legislate authoritatively on all the major classes of disputes in which nations engage. Nothing like it is attempted under the existing League. For his plan involves, whether Mr. Borah likes the name or not, the setting-up of a world legislture. The conference which was to make the code would have to lay down laws affecting the very existence of governments and the destiny of nations. It would have to legislate on questions touching their political independence, their liberties, their power, their prestige, their economic opportunities, and their pride.

    To talk easily about a conference to create an international code is either idle talk, or it is as stupendous a proposal as can be conceived in politics. It requires for the first time in human history the creation of a genuine world legislature. For, if the code was to be anytning more than a set of pious evasions, no one world conference could conceivably create it. One mignt as well have expected the first United States Congress to create in its first session

    {p. 173} a code of American national law. No: this world conference would have to convene and reconvene, and keep on, in the words of Mr. Borah’s resolution, amplifying the code, and expanding it, and adapting it, and bringing it down to date.

    This world legislature would unavoidably represent the cabinets and foreign offices of the day. Can any one imagine a government which did not keep a death grip on a delegation which was legislating on a rule affecting, let us say, the national boundaries? And thus there vanishes wholly the hope that the world can be governed, to use Mr. John Dewey’s terms, by “legal cooperation” without “political combination.” If there is to be law for the court to apply, there must be lawmakers. And lawmakers are politicians, guided for the most part by the pressures of their constituents upon their own ambitions and habits and personal ideals. Let Mr. Borah ask himself, then, whether he is prepared to entrust the creation of such a code to Lord Curzon, Mr. Hughes, M. Poincare, and Baron Kato, or to any other men he knows. And then let him ask himself whether he thinks the United States Senate will ratify a code that all the other parliaments of the world will also ratify.

    It requires no gift of prophecy to see that if he could induce the world to establish such a code, Mr. Borah and his most devoted followers would be lined up against ratification as irreconcilable opponents. They would hate the result if and when they

    {p. 174} achieved it. For any code created within this generation would have to legalize the status quo at the time the code was formulated. It is unthinkable that Great Britain, France, Japan, or the United States would agree on any specific set of principles which impaired their empires, their Monroe Doctrines, or their alleged strategic requirements. Lest there be any doubt on this point I quote from Senator Knox’s original speech of March 1, 1919, proposing the outlawry of war: “Under such a code we would not be called upon to arbitrate the policy involved in our Monroe Doctrine, our conservation policy, our immigration policy, our right to expel aliens, our right to repel invasion, our right to maintain military and naval establishments, or coaling-stations, within our borders or elsewhere as the protection and development of this country might demand, our right to make necessary fortifications of the Panama Canal or on our frontiers, our right to discriminate between natives and foreigners in respect to right of property and citizenship, and other matters of like character.”

    We must not be called upon, said Senator Knox, to arbitrate these questions. In other words, we would go to war rather than yield our position.

    One may call this the outlawry of war if one likes, but I suspect that a foreigner would call it the outlawry of those wars which might interfere with Senator Knox’s conception of the interests, needs, and manifest destiny of the United States. Let fifty

    {p. 175} other nations also draw up a catalogue of questions over which they would rather fight than submit to a tribunal, and the amount of war you will have outlawed will not be noticeable.

    The advocates of this plan are fond of saying that the “war system,” consisting of armaments, alliances, and the diplomacy of prestige and strategic advantages, rests upon the fact that war is “legalized.” Whether this be a correct analysis is not important in view of the fact that the advocates of the outlawry of war propose to continue to legalize all kinds of wars. “War shall be defined in the code,” says the Knox-Levinson plan, “and the right of defense against actual or imminent attack shall be preserved.” Senator Borah’s resolution seems to justify, in addition, wars of liberation. Now if you have the right to go to war for what you call your liberty, and the right to go to war because you think an attack is imminent, it would be a stupid Foreign Office indeed which could not legalize any war it thought necessary or desirable. The only war outlawed under this plan is a war openly announced to be a war of aggression. There are no such wars.

    The wars permitted under the outlawry of war are not confined to the defense of frontiers against invasion. If that were the case the advocates of the plan would agree to submit every international

    {p. 176} dispute to an international tribunal. We have seen that Senator Knox has no idea of doing any such thing. His list of disputes that may not be arbitrated covered all the really vital disputes in which the United States is likely to be involved. It covered all the main contentions with Japan, the whole field of Latin-American relations, our whole economic policy, our whole strategic and military system, and for good measure everything that “the protection and development of the country might demand.” Senator Borah, though less specific, is no less definitely against arbitrating vital questions. His way of excluding them from judicial processes is to deny that they are “purely international controversies.” But of course controversies between nations are none the less controversies because you choose not to call them international controversies. If you feel I am hurting you badly, you are not pacified by my telling you to mind your own business.

    The Borah plan to outlaw war consists of a code which, in theory, outlaws war and lays down rules governing all the relations among governments. But it consists also of a set of reservations which withdraw from the scope of the code and the competence of the court many, if not most, of the major policies which cause disputes. Finally it disembowels the outlawry of war by legalizing wars in defense of those major policies which are excluded from the competence of the court and the code.

    Mr. Borah, in other words, is proposing to outaw

    {p. 177} those wars which can be described as “purely international.” He is proposing to outlaw theoretical wars which nobody wishes to wage, since all actual wars result out of the conflict of sovereign, domestic interests. A “purely international controversy” which does not involve, or appear to involve, the domestic safety, domestic interests, or the domestic pride of the disputants is not worth worrying about. Even in this wicked and pugnacious world such a harmless and uninteresting controversy does not often lead to war. To outlaw war simply in respect to such controversies is a lot of trouble for nothing. For, until a man is willing to say that he is ready to submit any and every dispute affecting the peace of the world to adjudication, he has not made up his mind to outlaw war. An irreconcilable senator, who is jealous of American sovereignty, can play with the idea. He cannot really understand it and still believe in it.


    It is illuminating to inquire how an idea like the outlawry of war, which expresses so deep an aspiration, should have become so confused and sterile. The answer is to be found, I think, in Mr. Borall’s resolution, where he says that “the genius of civilization has discovered but two methods of compelling the settlement of human disputes; namely, law and war.” Mr. Borah means by law the judicial process, and in my opinion his generalization is utterly untrue.

    {p. 178} The genius of civilization has invented, besides law and war, countless other methods of settling disputes. It has invented diplomacy, representative government, federalism, mediation, conciliation, friendly intervention, compromise, and conference. The notion that the judicial process in a court is the only method of peace is fantastic. Mr. Borah, every day of his life, is engaged in adjusting disputes between the state of Idaho and other states, between capital and labor, between the farm bloc and thc manufacturers and bankers. If he believed that the only alternative to war was resort to the courts, he would not be wasting his talents in a nonjudicial body like the United States Senate. He would either be a judge or be arguing before judges.

    Nevertheless he believes, and many admirable people believe with him, that the only method of international peace is “to create a judicial substitute for war.” It is on this belief that the outlawry of war has foundered. For when you come to the actual task of creating this judicial substitute, you find, as Mr. Knox found and as Mr. Borah has found, that you cannot, or will not, devise a code of international law covering all disputes, and that you will not give to any court jurisdiction over all disputes. Therefore, in the pinch, you find yourself wishing to outlaw war but not to outlaw the wars you may feel compelled to wage.

    You find a large class of disputes which your judicial substitute will not cover. They are the most

    [p. 179} important disputes of all, because they involve precisely those vital interests about which people are most ready to fight. The difficulty is fundamental and inescapable in any plan to outlaw war by a purely judicial substitute. And, if you are really in earnest about minimizing or abolishing war, it is these marginal, nonjusticiable disputes which must occupy the center of attention.

    By the growth of international law some of these disputes can be made justiciable. But, for as long a future as we can foresee, there will remain whole classes of the most dangerous disputes which no code and no court can deal with. For them diplomacy is required, diplomacy working by conference, compromise, bargaining, good offices, and also, in the last analysis, I believe, by the threat of force. One may admit the role of force in diplomacy without embarrassment, considering how thoroughly the right to wage war is actually reserved by the advocates of the outlawry of war.

    The central fallacy of their argument is this refusal to acknowledge the necessity of diplomacy for just those war-breeding disputes which are not within the competence of their code and their court. For, if diplomacy is a necessary method of maintaining peace, then no plan which does not provide for it can be an effective plan to abolish war. And if the method of diplomacy is necessary, then the reform of that method is one of the most urgent of human needs.

    {p. 180} For “the diplomatic method,” as Mr. Root has pointed out, “is the necessary method of dealing with immediate exigencies and dangerous crises in affairs. Under such circumstances there is no other way to prevent disaster. Argument and persuasion and explanation, the removal of misapprehensions, the suggestion of obstacles and advantages, conciliation, concession, stipulations for the future, and the still more serious considerations to which diplomacy may finally resort – all these are employed to deal with immediate and acute situations. The slow processes of judicial procedure are not adapted to deal with such exigencies.”

    Mr. Root might have added that the judicial procedure inevitably is corrupted if it is burdened with the making of major political decisions. For, if the judges of Mr. Borah’s Court are asked to decide questions for which no rule of law exists, they must either invent a law and thus legislate, or, in the guise of law, they must make political deals. Mr. Borah, therefore, is not eliminating political entanglements. He is entangling his proposed court in the politics of the world. The result would be a court with all the vices of politics and a diplomacy as cumbersome as a lawsuit.

    This conclusion may be tested by considering another remarkable statement in Mr. Borah’s resolution. It is a pronouncement to the effect that our Supreme Court has maintained peace between the states. If that is true, what has been the function of

    {p. 181} the Executive and the Congress these last one hundred and thirty-five years? Does Senator Borah seriously think our Supreme Court, existing in a political vacuum, could have adjusted the sectional, group, and class conflicts of American history? He cannot think that, and therefore, when he has stopped to consider the matter, he cannot continue to think that an international court, in vacuo, can maintain the peace of the world.

    But Mr. Borah has not fully considered the matter. He speaks in his resolution of conferring upon a “real” international court jurisdiction modeled upon that of our Supreme Court. Mr. Borah has no smallest intention of doing any such thing. We may dogmatically assert this because we shall as soon behold the sun stand still in the sky as see the irreconcilable Senator from Idaho argue that nine judges at the Hague should have the same power to annul a law passed by Parliament or Congress as our Supreme Court has to annul the acts of a state legislature.


    Mr. Borah is not really promoting a practicable project that will stand up under analysis. He is giving currency to a metaphor, and a somewhat inaccurate metaphor at that, which, like its predecessor, “the war to end war,” condenses and expresses, but does not direct toward any organized result, the hatred of war. Incidentally, though that is no

    {p. 182} part of this discussion, he is exploiting the sentiment which the metaphor evokes in order to prevent our adherence to the only world court which exists, or in this generation is likely to exist. Once more we witness the tragic futility of noble sentiments frustrated by confused ideas.

    Once more a fine aspiration, which must be universal in order to prevail, has become entangled in the prejudices and politics of a faction. Once more we behold the spectacle, so delightful to Satan, of men who wish to establish universal confidence and cooperation on earth, refusing in the smallest measure to cooperate among themselves. It is a pity. For if Mr. Borah and his friends took the ideal of world cooperation seriously, and understood its difficulties, they would count it no slight matter that fifty sovereign nations have actually agreed on something, even though that something is as defective as the existing League and the existing Court. If Mr. Borah loved his ideal of cooperation as constantly as he yields to his habit of irrecocilability, he would wish to promote, rather than to destroy, what cooperation there is. For only by practice can cooperation become a habit. And only when cooperation is a powerful habit, will peoples be willing to make the enormous sacrifices which the outlawry of war must finally involve. But to say to the world, as Mr. Borah’s associates have in effect done from the start, that mankind must meet our terms or none, and cooperate on our principles or none,

    {p. 183} is to perpctuate precisely that temper of mind which the outlawry of war will most need to outlaw.

    Nor can we say to mankind: “Under the leadership of an American President we led you into a League of Nations, and under the intellectual leadership of an American lawyer we led you, with the apparent blessing of both political parties, into the Permanent Court of Intcrnational Justice. Now that you are in, and we are outside, it occurs to us to lead you out of the League and out of the Court. When you are out of the League and out of the Court we led you into, we promise to lead you into a much better court and perhaps even into another association of nations.”

    Were the Senate now to reject the existing Court, we should establish our reputation as a diplomatic philanderer. Prudent foreign governments when we made our next periodic proposal would have to ask bluntly whether the young man’s intentions were serious and honorable.

    August, 1923.


    ALL the world thinks of the United States today as an empire, except the people of the United States. We shrink from the word “empire,” and insist that it should not be used to describe the dominion we exercise from Alaska to the Philippines, from Cuba to Panama, and beyond. We feel that there ought to be some other name for the

    {p. 215} civilizing work which we do so reluctantly in these backward countries. I think the reluctance is genuine. I feel morally certain that an overwlelming majority of our citizens do not wish to rule other peoples, and that there is no hypocrisy in the pained protest which rises whenever a Latin-American or a European speaks of us as imperialistic. We do not feel ourselves to be imperialists as we understand

    Posted by Truth | December 22, 2013, 8:48 pm

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